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 Constraining and Channeling Corporate  
Political Power in Trump’s America 
 Kent  Greenfield * 
 After the Supreme Court decided  Citizens United v.  Federal Election 
Commission in 2010, it quickly joined the rogue’s gallery of most- despised 
Supreme Court decisions in modern history. Most of the opponents of the 
decision have focused their energy on one matter of constitutional theory and 
one matter of strategy. The fi rst has been to challenge the constitutional rights 
of corporations generally; the second has been to marshal support for a consti-
tutional amendment to overturn the ruling. 
 I, too, believe  Citizens United was wrongly decided, at least in rationale 
if not on its facts. I have nevertheless questioned many of the arguments of 
those who oppose corporate constitutional rights and I have also expressed 
reservations about an amendment remedy. 1  My support for corporate consti-
tutional rights is hardly absolute, and my skepticism about an amendment is 
as much strategic as substantive. I also believe that it is reasonable to worry 
about the infl uence of corporate power in our elections and in our democracy 
generally. But I have been a contrarian among the ideological and academic 
left in how to respond to these diffi culties. 
 *  Kent Greenfi eld is Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar at Boston College Law 
School. The author thanks Timothy Kuhner and Eugene Mazo for the invitation to contribute 
to this volume, and Sheila Krumholz for assistance with, and access to, data of corporate 
independent expenditures. The author also thanks Anna E. Sanders for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1   See, e.g. ,  Kent  Greenfield ,  Corporations Are People Too (And They Should Act 
Like It) ( 2018 ) ;  Kent  Greenfield ,  In Defense of Corporate Persons ,  30  Const. Comment .  309 
( 2015 ) (hereafter  Corporate Persons );  Kent  Greenfield ,  Let Us Now Praise Corporate Persons , 
 The Washington Monthly (Jan./ Feb.  2015 ) ;  Kent  Greenfield ,  Why Progressives Should 
Oppose A Constitutional Amendment to End Corporate “Personhood,”  Huff. Post (Jan. 26, 
 2012 ) ;  Kent  Greenfi eld ,  How to Make the Citizens United Decision Even Worse ,  Wash. Post 
(Jan. 19,  2012 ) . 
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 My contrariness toward the most full- throated critiques of  Citizens United 
has been two- fold. First, I have argued that the question of corporate constitu-
tional rights is more complicated than most critics acknowledge. 2  Protecting 
the ability of corporate entities to bring constitutional claims— that is, 
protecting corporate constitutional “personhood”— is a valuable element in 
constraining the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.  Citizens United 
was incorrectly decided not because it recognized the constitutional right of 
corporations to speak; rather it was incorrect in applying a simplistically lib-
ertarian view of free speech to campaign fi nance reforms and by rejecting 
compelling governmental interests in constraining the power of money in 
politics. Second, the best way to ameliorate the problems of corporate power 
in American electoral and political processes is through adjustments in cor-
porate law rather than constitutional law. 3  The problem of corporate involve-
ment in politics is not that corporations speak. The problem is that they speak 
not for all their stakeholders but for a sliver of the fi nancial and managerial 
elite. And that problem is best addressed through corporate law rather than 
constitutional law. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to fl esh out three concrete examples of how 
corporate law and other areas of business regulation might be adjusted to 
mitigate some of the harmful effects of corporate political involvement. One 
can disagree with, or be agnostic toward, my (limited) defense of corporate 
constitutional rights and still fi nd these concrete examples intriguing. If we 
worry about corporate power in democracy, we need not limit ourselves to 
constitutional remedies alone. 4  Non- constitutional remedies are worthy of our 
attention and our efforts as well. 
 The fi rst of the three concrete suggestions focuses on the obligations 
and structure of corporate governance. If corporations are to act as citizens 
in a democracy, we can require corporations to import democratic norms 
within their governance structures. If corporations were more democratically 
structured so that the interests and concerns of all their important stakeholders 
were taken into account with regard to corporate decisions, it would be less 
 2   Greenfi eld,  Corporate Persons ,  supra  note 1 , at 315– 27. 
 3   Id . at 327– 30. 
 4   Though in some instances the advocates of a constitutional amendment have marshaled 
arguments that include an attentiveness to the interests of shareholders. This has made it 
appear that some opponents of  Citizens United have signed onto the corporate governance 
notion of shareholder primacy, a highly contested view of corporate governance usually 
associated with the ideological right. As I discuss below, shareholder primacy is part of the 
problem and should not be part of the solution.  See Greenfi eld,  Corporate Persons ,  supra  note 
1 , at 330– 32 (describing how opponents of corporate personhood are bolstering shareholder 
primacy). 
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problematic for them to participate in the public sphere. In other words, if 
corporations spoke less for the fi nancial and managerial elite and more for 
others who contribute to their success, their involvement would more likely 
refl ect a pluralistic perspective and pose less risk of skewing the public debate. 
 The second policy idea relates to taxation. We know that the government 
can condition tax benefi ts on the agreement of recipients to do or not do cer-
tain things. Non- profi t charitable organizations, for example, are prohibited 
from engaging in core political speech as a condition of benefi cial tax status. 5  
This legal tool is subject to important constraints, most notably a doctrine that 
limits the ability of government to condition benefi ts on the recipient’s waiver 
of constitutional rights. This rule is known as the “doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions,” and its contours have bedeviled the courts and scholars for 
decades. 6  But I believe a provision can be crafted that would limit corporate 
political activity and withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
 The third idea is to use state law to include limitations on corporate polit-
ical activity within the foundational chartering documents of corporations in 
their state of incorporation. This idea, like the second, uses the fact that gov-
ernment can impose conditions on government benefi ts. This idea is frankly 
more problematic as a matter of constitutional law than the second idea, for 
reasons I will explain. But it is worth exploring further, and I believe that there 
are ways to impose limits on corporate political activity with this mechanism 
that will pass constitutional muster. 
 But before sketching these ideas, this chapter will fi rst grapple with the 
implications of Donald Trump ’s recent election for the debate on corporate 
political power. 
 5   Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 6   The Court has not been clear as to when government benefi ts can be conditioned on the waiver 
of a constitutional right.  Cf. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 
U.S. 205(2013) (striking down condition on funding); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rts., 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (upholding conditions on funding). Academic commentary on the 
question is abundant. For a sampling see, for example,  Mitchell N.  Berman ,  Coercion Without 
Baselines:  Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions ,  90  Geo. L.J.  1 ( 2001 ) ;  David 
 Cole ,  Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:  Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government- 
Funded Speech ,  67  N.Y.U. L. Rev.  675 ( 1992 ) ;  Richard A.  Epstein ,  The Supreme Court, 1987 
Term— Foreword:  Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent ,  102 
 Harv. L.  Rev.  4 ( 1988 ) ;  Robert L.  Hale ,  Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional 
Rights ,  35  Colum. L.  Rev.  321 ( 1935 ) ;  Frederick  Schauer ,  Too Hard:  Unconstitutional 
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency ,  72  Denv. U. L. Rev.  989 ( 1995 ) ; 
 Kathleen M.  Sullivan ,  Unconstitutional Conditions ,  102  Harv. L. Rev.  1413 ( 1989 ) ;  Cass R. 
 Sunstein ,  Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism ,  70  B.U. L. Rev. 
 593 ( 1990 ) . 
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 I.  Corporate Power and Donald Trump 
 In November 2016, the seismic political event of the twenty- fi rst century 
occurred. To say the election of Donald Trump as President of the United 
States came as a surprise is a profound understatement. That someone of his 
insincerity and intellectual laziness, with his violent, race- baiting rhetoric, 
misogyny, and xenophobia could be elected to the most powerful political 
offi ce in the world was a shock. Indeed, for those who had hoped the United 
States would rise to its better nature rather than succumb to its baser instincts, 
it felt like a crushing blow. Legal scholars, political scientists, journalists, 
sociologists, and historians will study the election of 2016 for decades. It may 
be quite some time before we can make sense of what happened. 
 At fi rst glance, one might suggest that the election of 2016 poses a counter 
example to those scholars who have been warning of the power of money in 
elections. The Super PAC money in 2016 was not on Trump ’s side. 7  Democratic 
nominee Hillary Clinton spent more money overall, 8  and more than twice as 
much independent money was spent in opposition to Trump than in oppos-
ition to Clinton . 9  Indeed, Trump used free media exposure masterfully, spent 
relatively little money early on, and did not start running television ads for the 
general election until August of 2016, a strikingly late date. 10  In the general 
election, many of the traditional sources of large contributions abandoned 
Trump , 11  including the Koch Brothers . 12  While Trump ’s contributions and 
spending surged late, 13  there is little doubt that Hillary Clinton ’s campaign 
and her supporters spent much more money than Trump and his supporters. 
So in the end, the candidate who spent the most money was the progressive 
  7   Anu  Narayanswamy ,  Darla  Cameron &  Matea  Gold ,  Election 2016: Money Raised as of Dec. 
31 ,  Wash. Post (Feb. 1,  2017 ) ,  www.washingtonpost.com/ graphics/ politics/ 2016- election/ 
campaign- fi nance . 
  8   Fredreka  Schouten ,  How Trump Won by Spending Half as Much Money as Clinton ,  USA Today 
(Nov. 10,  2016 ) ,  www.usatoday.com/ story/ news/ politics/ elections/ 2016/ 2016/ 11/ 09/ another- way- 
 trumps- bid- changed- politics/ 93565370/ . 
  9   2016 Outside Spending, by Candidate ,  Center for Responsive Politics (Nov. 28,  2016 ) , 
www.opensecrets.org/ outsidespending/ summ.php?cycle=2016&disp=C&type=R . 
 10   Arnie  Seipel ,  Trump Campaign to Run First General Election TV Ads ,  NPR (Aug. 16,  2016 ) , 
www.npr.org/ 2016/ 08/ 16/ 490294221/ trump- campaign- to- run- fi rst- general- election- tv- ads . 
  11   Jonathan  Martin ,  Alexander  Burns &  Maggie  Haberman ,  Cut Ties to Donald Trump, Big 
Donors Urge R.N.C. ,  N.Y. Times (Oct. 14,  2016 ) ,  www.nytimes.com/ 2016/ 10/ 14/ us/ politics/ 
republican- donors- trump.html?_ r=0 . 
 12   Andy  Kroll ,  Trump Might Be a Dream Come True for Megarich Campaign Donors , 
 Mother Jones (Jan./ Feb.  2017 ) ,  www.motherjones.com/ politics/ 2016/ 11/ donald- trump-  
dark- money- election . 
 13   Russ  Choma ,  Millions of Dollars Pouring in for Trump at Last Minute ,  Mother Jones 
(Nov. 7,  2016 ) ,  www.motherjones.com/ politics/ 2016/ 11/ last- seven- days- money . 
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and the Democrat, and she lost the election (or at least, most importantly, the 
vote of the Electoral College). 
 If one focuses more particularly on the role of  corporate money in the 2016 
presidential cycle, there too one could tell the story that the critics of  Citizens 
United have been misdirecting their efforts. In the 2012 election, we saw the 
bulk of independent expenditures originate not from corporate treasuries but 
from high net- worth individuals. In the 2016 cycle, corporate money again 
stayed largely on the sidelines. 14  Indeed, according to data provided by the 
Center for Responsive Politics, only one publicly traded company contributed 
$1 million or more to a Super PAC supporting a presidential candidate in 2016. 
And that was from a clean energy company to Jeb Bush , who dropped out in 
February of that year. 15  Both of the major party’s nominees were polarizing and 
few corporations wanted to risk alienating millions of voters by aligning with 
one candidate or the other. Trump ’s candidacy was particularly disruptive and 
incendiary. A number of corporations withdrew their sponsorship connections 
with the Republican National Convention after it became clear that Trump 
had accumulated the delegates necessary for the nomination. 16  
 A reasonable case could be made, then, that the election of 2016 indicates 
that the worst predictions of the implications of  Citizens United have not come 
true. Corporate money has not fl ooded into presidential politics. Independent 
expenditures have not been so massive as to dictate outcomes at the national 
level. And worries that  Citizens United would create an ideological skewing 
of the electoral “marketplace of ideas” toward the political right have not 
been borne out. It is quite likely, in fact, that Clinton ’s defeat would have 
 14   According to the  New York Times , as of February 2016, in the heat of the primary season, 87 
donors had given at least $1 million to a candidate or a candidate’s Super- PACs. Of those 87, 
only nine donors were for- profi t corporations. Of those, only one was publicly traded. Of the 
eight private companies, most appear to be dominated by a single owner.  See  Wilson  Andrews 
et al.,  Million- Dollar Donors in the 2016 Presidential Race ,  N.Y. Times (Feb. 9,  2016 ) ,  www 
.nytimes.com/ interactive/ 2016/ us/ elections/ top- presidential- donors- campaign- money.html ; 
 Theo  Francis ,  Despite Citizens United, Corporate Super PAC Contributions Trail Individuals, 
Study Finds ,  Wall St. J. (Nov. 2,  2016 ) ,  www.wsj.com/ articles/ despite- citizens- united-  
corporate- super- pac- contributions- trail- individuals- study- fi nds- 1478059201 ;  The Landscape 
of Campaign Contributions (Committee for Econ. Dev. of the Conf. Board, Nov. 2016), 
www.ced.org/ pdf/ Election_ Spending_ Report_ - _ Nov_ 2016.PDF . 
 15   Right to Rise USA, Contributors, 2016 Cycle,  Center for Responsive Politics,  www 
.opensecrets.org/ pacs/ pacgave2.php?cycle=2016&cmte=C00571372 .  See also  2016 Top Donors 
to Outside Spending Groups ,  Center for Responsive Politics ,  www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/ summ.php?cycle=2016&disp=D&type=O&superonly=N . 
 16   Zachary  Mider &  Elizabeth  Dexheimer ,  More Companies Opt to Sit Out Trump’s Coronation 
in Cleveland ,  Bloomberg Pol. (June 16,  2016 ) ,  www.bloomberg.com/ politics/ articles/ 2016- 
06- 16/ more- companies- opt- to- sit- out- trump- s- coronation- in- cleveland . 
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been larger if her campaign had not been bolstered by her advantage in inde-
pendent spending. 
 Indeed, one might say that  Citizen United ’s protection of corporate speech 
rights will be quite important in Trump ’s America. Corporations certainly 
have their ideological commitments and biases that do not always correlate 
with the public interest. But their commitments rarely include the racism, 
Islamophobia, homophobia, xenophobia, and misogyny that was evident at 
Trump ’s rallies (and continue, in my view, to be evident in his Presidency). 
Corporations are often inclusive in ways that many Americans living in homo-
geneous, culturally anxious, economically distressed, insular tribes are not. 
Corporate marketing evidences this pluralistic impulse. A current Cover Girl 
wears a hijab. A recent commercial for Amazon features a priest and an imam 
sharing tea. A Coca- Cola ad running in the months after Trump ’s election 
featured a diverse array of Americans singing “America the Beautiful” in a 
multitude of languages. 
 It is no coincidence that these commercials contain an inclusive vision 
of America that looks quite different from what we saw from the Trump 
campaign. 17  
 It is unlikely, for example, that large corporations will become supporters 
of legislative embodiments of the nationalist urges that found voice in the 
Trump campaign. Nor will large corporations likely support large- scale 
deportations or efforts to weaken international trade agreements. And many 
large corporations have spoken out forcefully against proposed retreats on 
affi rmative action or on protections for LGBTQ Americans. 18  
 17   A 2016 television advertisement for Amazon shows an elderly Catholic priest and an elderly 
Muslim imam sharing tea and later ordering knee pads for the other; the commercial ends 
with both kneeling in prayer.  See  Elizabeth  Weise ,  Amazon Ad May Be First to Feature a 
Muslim Cleric ,  USA Today (Nov. 16,  2016 ) ,  www.usatoday.com/ story/ tech/ news/ 2016/ 11/ 16/ 
amazon- ad- may- fi rst- feature- muslim- cleric/ 93944166/ . Coca- Cola ran ads during 2016 that 
showed a diverse array of Americans singing “America the Beautiful” in a variety of languages. 
 See MPR Group,  Coca Cola— America the Beautiful— Super Bowl Ad ,  YouTube ,  www 
.youtube.com/ watch?v=xYVu7tRXuoM . The new “Cover Girl” is Muslim, and wears a hijab. 
 Sarah  Larimer ,  She’s One of the New Faces of CoverGirl, And She’s Wearing a Hijab ,  Wash. 
Post (Nov. 8,  2016 ) ,  www.washingtonpost.com/ news/ acts- of- faith/ wp/ 2016/ 11/ 08/ shes- one- of- 
the- new- faces- of- covergirl- and- shes- wearing- a- hijab/ . 
 18   Abby  Jackson ,  Fortune 100 Companies Tell the Supreme Court Why America Still Needs 
Affirmative Action ,  Bus. Insider (Nov. 6,  2015 ) ,  www.businessinsider.com/ fortune- 100- 
companies- issue- amacus- brief- in- support- of- affirmative- action- at- university- of- texas- 2015- 
11 ;  See  Updated List: Who Has Spoken for, against NC’s New LGBT Law ,  Charlotte 
Observer ,  www.charlotteobserver.com/ news/ business/ article69251877.html ;  Andrés     
 Martinez ,  Give Corporations More Political Power— Seriously ,  Time Mag. (July 10, 
 2015 ) . 
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 In other words, large corporations may provide a brake on some of Trump ’s 
worst political tendencies. Of course, a small number of businesses that align 
themselves with Trump ’s kleptocracy may enrich themselves in the short 
term. The fi nancial industry may support deregulation even if not in the 
public interest, and Exxon is hardly the company to trust to educate the new 
President about climate change. But most businesses, like most Americans, 
have too much at stake over the long term in a global economy to rest their 
fortunes on a xenophobic, narrow- minded, isolationist president. 
 But the story I have just told is too sanguine about the role and power of 
corporations. In fact, the election of Donald Trump is in some ways the result 
of the misuse of corporate power. 
 Even if it is unclear whether independent spending (or corporate inde-
pendent spending) has affected  outcomes in a material way, contributions and 
independent spending have certainly affected  politicians . There is little doubt 
that contributions (and presumably independent spending) affects access to 
politicians. If you give money to candidates or spend money on their behalf, 
you will have their ear. Instead of looking only at how campaign money affects 
electoral outcomes, it is more important to look at how it affects lobbying 
efforts. And studies show that campaign contributions lead to lobbying 
success. 19  
 And though corporations may be shy about weighing in too heavily in 
presidential politics, they do not shy away from spending money in congres-
sional races. They do so not only through direct corporate contributions but 
also through trade groups and corporate PACs and by way of donations from 
individual executives. 20  And corporations then layer on billions of dollars of 
lobbying expenses. Most years, over $3 billion is spent lobbying Congress— 
most from corporations and trade groups of businesses. 21  
 This advantageous access and the legislative success it engenders add to the 
public perception that the system is “rigged.” The public’s disassociation from 
 19   See  Raquel  Alexander ,  Stephen W.  Mazza &  Susan  Scholz ,  Measuring Rates of Return on 
Lobbying Expenditures: Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations ,  25 
 J.L. & Pol.  401 (2009) ;  Brad  Plumer ,  The Outsized Returns from Lobbying ,  Wash. Post (Oct. 
10,  2011 ) ,  www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/ ezra- klein/ post/ the- outsized- returns- from- lobbying/ 
2011/ 10/ 10/ gIQADSNEaL_ blog.html?utm_ term=.3fddf4974cf3 . 
 20   See Top PACs ,  Center for Responsive Politics,  www.opensecrets.org/ overview/ toppacs 
.php?cycle=2016 ;  Top Organization Contributions:  All Federal Contributions ,  Center for 
Responsive Politics,  www.opensecrets.org/ overview/ toporgs.php ;  Hot Races ,  Center for 
Responsive Politics,  www.opensecrets.org/ overview/ hotraces.php . 
 21   See  Top Spenders ,  Center for Responsive Politics ,  www.opensecrets.org/ lobby/ top.php? 
indexType=s&showYear=2016 ;  Lobbying Database ,  Center for Responsive Politics , 
www.opensecrets.org/ lobby/ index.php . 
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822906.011
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Boston College, on 25 Sep 2019 at 17:49:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Constraining Corporate Political Power 247
247
and disgust with mainstream politics gave momentum not only to Trump but 
also to the “outsider” candidacy of Bernie Sanders in the Democratic Party. 
In this view,  Citizens United did not lead to Trump ’s victory in any direct 
sense but added to the overall distrust of the political system and its loyalty to 
fi nancial and corporate elites, which created the context in which Trump ’s 
victory was possible. Notwithstanding the (ironic) short- term benefi ts of the 
decision within the 2016 election and during the Trump presidency, it could 
indeed be that Trump would not be President but for  Citizens United and 
the corporate elitism and prerogatives it embodied. At the very least,  Citizens 
United refl ected and furthered the larger obtuseness of the American political 
system to the interests of working- class Americans, and those chickens fi nally 
came home to roost. (The irony of Americans disillusioned by elitism putting 
their faith in a putative- billionaire- casino- and- golf- resort- magnate is a topic 
for another day.) 
 Another thing to note is that the frustration and anger of Americans who 
resorted to voting for Trump (and for Sanders ) was not simply a political 
anger. The system was not only “rigged” politically. There was signifi cant eco-
nomic frustration as well, and Trump ’s diatribes against trade agreements and 
Sanders ’s remonstrations against economic inequality found eager listeners. 
 These frustrations are not unrelated. There is a link between corporate pol-
itical advantage and economic stagnation. The privileged access granted to 
those who contribute fi nancially to politicians not only skews the legislative 
process but the economic marketplace as well. In fact, often the very purpose 
of lobbying efforts is to affect the economic marketplace. Lobbying efforts add 
to or even take the place of efforts to win competitive advantage by improving 
goods, services, or pricing. Business advantage gained politically— by disad-
vantaging competitors or gaining ways to externalize costs onto employees, 
customers, communities, or the environment— has the same impact on the 
balance sheet as business advantage gained in the marketplace. Yet from the 
standpoint of society’s balance sheet, the two are not identical at all. Unfair 
political advantages frequently create unfair economic advantages, which 
individual businesses see as net gain but which society suffers as deadweight 
losses. This means that successful campaign fi nance reforms should not only 
be thought of as fi xes for democracy. They will be economically benefi cial 
as well, because it will focus corporations on gaining competitive advantage 
through economic markets, not through the political market. 22  
 Having said that, there is now virtually no chance that the Supreme 
Court will change in the near term in a way that will lead to a weakening of 
 22   See generally  Greenfield, Corporations Are People Too,  supra note  1. 
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 Citizens United and the rest of the Court’s campaign fi nance jurisprudence. 
Though Trump ’s campaign gave voice to the frustrations of the economically 
dispossessed, his nominees to the Supreme Court (like his fi rst, Neil Gorsuch ) 
will likely be from the jurisprudentially conservative mainstream. Unless the 
Court moves signifi cantly to the left, which is quite unlikely now, there is 
little likelihood that the Court will abandon its fl awed campaign fi nance jur-
isprudence. Limitations on contributions and independent expenditures in 
elections will continue to receive strict scrutiny. Existing jurisprudence, mis-
taken as it is, will need to be taken as given for quite some time. Changes will 
have to come from elsewhere. 
 To those ideas we now turn. 
 II.  Idea Number One: Change Corporate Governance 
 The problem of corporate power in elections is an iteration of the larger problem 
of corporate power more generally. Compared to those of other nations, the 
social contract of American corporations is thin. The executives who run 
American corporations do not generally think of themselves as having obligations 
to the public. The concerns of employees, communities, consumers, the envir-
onment, and the public interest in general matter only to the extent they have 
implications for the company’s bottom line and share price. Otherwise, they are 
elbowed aside. Corporations tend to be managed aggressively to maximize share-
holder return. As a result, the risks they run— whether of oil spills in the Gulf 
or of fi nancial crises erupting from Wall Street— are often unrecognized until 
too late. And corporate involvement in politics— and corporate speech more 
generally— is often used in service of corporations’ narrow, shareholder- focused, 
managerially driven obligations. 
 A cycle has been created. The Court’s increasing deference to corporate speech 
rights offers corporations another tool through which to exercise their consider-
able economic power. Their economic power is then used to bolster further their 
political power, which is brought to bear to increase their economic power. 
 Efforts to overturn  Citizens United by way of doctrinal change or 
constitutional amendment work on the political side of this cycle. 
Those efforts face conceptual and tactical obstacles and major change 
is likely foreclosed in the immediate future. That is not to say that 
scholars and activists should cease their work on the political power of 
corporations. Scholars are doing important work, 23  and activist pressures 
 23   See, e.g. ,  John C.  Coates, IV ,  Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After 
Citizens United ,  9  J. Emp. Legal Stud .  657 ( 2012 ) ;  Ciara  Torres- Spelliscy ,  Corporate 
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on corporations to disclose their political involvement are having an 
impact. 24  
 But the cycle might also be weakened by focusing on the corporate side of the 
loop. The fact that corporations exert their considerable economic and political 
power in the service of a narrow group of managerial and fi nancial elites is not 
a function of constitutional law or corporate “personhood.” It is a function of— 
indeed a fundamental fl aw of— corporate law. 25  As a problem of corporate law it 
can be fi xed by corporate law. 
 For about 100 years, the central failure of corporate governance in the United 
States has been the requirement— enforced through both law and norms— that 
corporations must be managed to further the interests of shareholders. Scholars 
disagree on whether, in practice, these corporate governance rules provide more 
protection for shareholders or managers. But one thing is absolute: corporate law 
in the United States— and by that I mean the corporate law of Delaware 26  — 
cares not at all about employees, communities, customers, or other stakeholders, 
except insofar as shareholders also gain. If there is a confl ict, shareholders must 
win. As Leo Strine , the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, recently 
wrote, executives who take care of an “interest other than stockholder wealth” 
breach their fi duciary duties. 27  
 A number of corporate scholars have challenged these assumptions for 
some time, arguing that corporations should be seen as having robust social 
and public obligations that cannot be encapsulated in share prices. 28  These 
Democracy from Say on Pay to Say on Politics ,  30  Const. Comment .  431 ( 2015 ) ;  Maggie 
 McKinley ,  Lobbying and the Petition Clause ,  68  Stan. L. Rev.  1131 ( 2016 ) . 
 24   See  The 2016 CPA- Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and 
Accountability ( 2016 ) ,  http:// fi les.politicalaccountability.net/ index/ 2016_ Index.pdf . 
 25   See  Kent  Greenfield ,  The Failure of Corporate Law:  Fundamental Flaws and 
Progressive Possibilities ( 2006 ) . 
 26   Kent  Greenfield ,  End Delaware’s Corporate Dominance ,  39  Democracy: A Journal of Ideas , 
Winter  2016 ,  https:// democracyjournal.org/ magazine/ 39/ end- delawares- corporate- dominance/ 
 27   See  Leo E.  Strine ,  The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear- Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law ,  50 
 Wake Forest L. Rev .  761 ( 2015 ) . 
 28   For a selection, see  Lynn A.  Stout ,  The Shareholder Value Myth:  How Putting 
Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public ( 2012 ) ; 
 Lawrence E.  Mitchell ,  Progressive Corporate Law ( 1995 ) ;  Brett  McDonnell , 
 Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance ,  46  Wake Forest L. Rev.  429 ( 2011 ) ; 
 Timothy P.  Glynn ,  Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder Conception 
of the Production of Corporate Law ,  58  Case W. Res. L. Rev.  1067 ( 2009 ) ;  Judd F.  Sneirson , 
 Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profi tability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance , 
 94  Iowa L.  Rev.  987 ( 2009 ) ;  Cynthia A.  Williams &  John M.  Conley ,  An Emerging Third 
Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo- American Shareholder Value Construct ,  38  Cornell Int’l 
L.J.  493 ( 2005 ) ;  Marleen A.  O’Connor ,  The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
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“progressive” corporate scholars argue that the fi duciary duties of managers 
should be extended to employees and other corporate stakeholders, or to the 
company as a whole defi ned as those who meaningfully invest in the col-
lective success of the fi rm. 29  
 One way to make these obligations operational is to make the decision- 
making structure of the company itself more pluralistic. In a number of 
European countries, for example, companies have “codetermined” board 
structures that require representation of both shareholders and employees. 30  
Even with these management structures, corporations continue their focus 
on building wealth— that is the core purpose of the corporate form— but not 
only for a narrow sliver of equity investors. And it works. Germany, where 
codetermination is strongest, is the economic powerhouse of Europe. The 
CEO of the German company Siemens argues that codetermination is a 
“comparative advantage” for Germany. And a senior managing director of the 
U.S. investment fi rm Blackstone Group said that codetermination was one of 
the factors that allowed Germany to avoid the worst of the fi nancial crisis. 31  
 If corporations were held to a more robust social contract and governed 
themselves more pluralistically, their involvement in the political arena would 
be less worrisome. A  possible cure for the fact that American corporations 
have become a vehicle for the voices and interests of a small managerial and 
fi nancial elite is more democracy  within businesses— more participation in 
corporate governance by workers, communities, shareholders, and consumers. 
If corporations were more democratic, their participation in the nation’s polit-
ical debate would be of less concern and they could even become a force for 
positive political change. 
 Ironically, many opponents of  Citizens United make arguments that seem 
to cut against these governance reforms. Skeptics of corporate “personhood” 
often characterize corporations as having a narrow social role; because of that 
narrow role, the argument goes, they owe it to shareholders to stay out of pol-
itics. These arguments implicitly— and sometimes explicitly— bolster share-
holder primacy. 
Law to Facilitate Labor- Management Cooperation ,  78  Cornell L. Rev.  899 ( 1993 ) ;  David 
 Millon ,  Redefi ning Corporate Law ,  24  Ind. L. Rev.  223 ( 1991 ) . 
 29   See generally  Greenfield ,  supra  note 25 . 
 30   Aline  Conchon ,  Board- Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe: Facts 
and Trends ( 2011 ) ,  www.etui.org/ Publications2/ Reports/ Board- level- employee- representation- 
rights- in- Europe .  See also MAP: Board- Level Representation in the European Economic 
Area , Worker- Participation.Eu ,  www.worker- participation.eu/ National- Industrial- Relations/ 
Across- Europe/ Board- level- Representation2/ MAP- Board- level- representation- in- the- European- 
 Economic- Area2 . 
 31   Conchon ,  supra  note 30 , at 8. 
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 Take for instance Justice John Paul Stevens ’s dissent in  Citizens United 
itself. He argued, among other things, that corporate speech should be 
limited in order to protect shareholders’ investments. Shareholders are seen 
as owners, as “those who pay for an electioneering communication,” and are 
assumed to have “invested in the business corporation for purely economic 
reasons.” 32  Stevens argued that corporate political speech did not merit pro-
tection because:
 [T] he structure of a business corporation … draws a line between the 
corporation’s economic interests and the political preferences of the individ-
uals associated with the corporation; the corporation must engage the elect-
oral process with the aim to enhance the profi tability of the company, no 
matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader … set of priorities. 33  
 Even more revealing, Stevens cites as support a set of corporate governance 
principles adopted by the prestigious American Law Institute. These principles 
were the product of compromise, both asking corporations to look after share-
holder interests and allowing them to act with an eye toward “ethical” and 
“humanitarian” purposes. But Stevens quoted only the language embodying 
shareholder primacy: “A corporation … should have as its objective the con-
duct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profi t and share-
holder gain.” 34  
 Some opponents of  Citizens United are following Stevens into the 
shareholder- rights trap. Common Cause has a “featured campaign” for 
“strengthening shareholder rights.” 35  The Brennan Center for Justice is 
supporting a “shareholder protection act” and calls shareholders “the actual 
owners” of corporations.” 36  Professor Jamie Raskin of American University 
(now a United States Congressman) is one of the smartest and most energetic 
academic opponents of  Citizens United , yet he says that corporations should 
not be spending in elections because, “after all, it’s [shareholders’] money.” 37  
 32   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475– 76 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 33   Id . at 469– 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 34   Id . at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting  A.L.I. ,  Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations , § 2.01(a) 55 (1992)).  See also  Melvin Aron  Eisenberg ,  An 
Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance ,  48  Bus. Law .  1271 ( 1993 ) . 
 35   Money in Politics ,  Common Cause ,  www.commoncause.org/ issues/ money- in- politics/ . 
 36   Elizabeth  Kennedy ,  Protecting Shareholders after Citizens United ,  Brennan Center 
for Justice (July 13,  2011 ) ,  www.brennancenter.org/ blog/ protecting- shareholders-after- 
 citizens- united . 
 37   Jamie B.  Raskin ,  A Shareholder Solution to ‘Citizens United,’  Wash. Post (Oct. 3,  2014 ) ,  www 
.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/ a- shareholder- solution- to- citizens- united/ 2014/ 10/ 03/ 5e07c3ee- 
48be- 11e4- b72e- d60a9229cc10_ story.html . 
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This is all shareholder primacy language brought to bear in fi ghting  Citizens 
United . 
 Wall Street loves talk of shareholder rights. To be sure, many Americans 
are shareholders through our retirement accounts and the like. But “widows 
and orphans” are still the minority; most stock held in American businesses is 
owned by the very wealthy. (The richest 5 percent of Americans own over 2/ 3 
of all stock assets. The bottom 40 percent— 125 million working class people— 
essentially own nothing in terms of stock. 38  ) So when opponents of  Citizens 
United focus on shareholder rights, they are singing Wall Street’s tune. 
 I wish this shareholder- protective rhetoric was just that, but it is not. 
Corporate personhood opponents urge, as an intermediate measure short of a 
constitutional amendment, that corporations be required to seek shareholder 
approval before spending corporate money on political campaigns. 39  There is 
something tempting in this position, if only because such a rule would help 
ensure executives do not spend corporate monies on issues and candidates 
opposing company interests. But that benefi t is probably marginal and comes 
at the risk of validating corporate involvement in the political process in fur-
therance of shareholder value and to the detriment of other stakeholders. 
A  rule that corporations could speak out in favor of Wall Street but not 
employees could be worse, not better, than our current broad allowance of 
corporate speech. 
 Instead, corporations should be constrained by requirements within cor-
porate law itself that their managers take into account the interests of all of 
the company’s major stakeholders. Companies should not be contributing 
their monies and their voices only to further the interests of their wealthiest 
investors. If corporations were required to think of their social obligations as 
broader and more robust than simply maximizing shareholder value, then 
their involvement in politics would more likely be in furtherance of the 
interests of their stakeholders. It would be less “them” and more “us.” There 
is nothing inherently undemocratic in corporate speech, unless corporations 
themselves are undemocratic. Essentially, we could take the  Citizens United 
Court at its word and seek to make corporations themselves more like the 
“associations of citizens” that the Court assumed they are. 40  
 38   Wealth Groups’ Shares of Assets, by Asset Type, 2010 ,  Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Aug. 20,  2012 ) ,  www 
.stateofworkingamerica.org/ chart/ swa- wealth- table- 6- 6- wealth- groups- shares/ ;  Wealth Groups’ 
Shares of Total Household Stock Wealth, 1983– 2010 ,  Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Aug. 24,  2012 ) ,  www 
.stateofworkingamerica.org/ chart/ swa- wealth- fi gure- 6g- wealth- groups- shares/ . 
 39   Ciara Torress- Spelliscy,  Corporate Campaign Spending: Giving Shareholders A Voice ,  Brennan 
Center for Justice ,  www.brennancenter.org/ publication/ corporate- campaign- spending- 
 giving- shareholders- voice . 
 40   Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
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 Is this change too much of a long shot? In a sense it is— if only because 
it would require a profound change in how we conceptualize corporations. 
Corporations would shift from pieces of property owned by a sliver of the 
fi nancial elite into collective enterprises benefi tting from the contributions of 
stakeholders who have a role in governing the company because of their stake 
in the company’s long- term wellbeing. Once this conceptual change takes 
hold, the legal adjustments are straightforward and much less demanding 
than a constitutional amendment. A national corporate governance law would 
require a simple majority vote in Congress followed by the president’s signa-
ture. In fact, a national law need not be the fi rst step. Because corporate gov-
ernance has traditionally been a function of state law, many of these changes 
could take place one state at a time. 41  
 Citizens United recognized the corporate right to speak in the American 
public square. Now, that poses a major problem for our democracy because 
corporations amplify the voices of a tiny number of the fi nancial and man-
agerial elite— the notorious 1  percent. If companies gave voice to a more 
diverse and pluralistic set of interests, the fact that corporations speak 
would not undermine democracy. On the contrary, corporate speech would 
amplify it. 
 III.  Idea Number Two: Change Corporate Tax Law 
 Because the Supreme Court’s decision in  Citizens United was based on its 
reading of the First Amendment, the legislative options are quite narrow. 
Congress cannot, of course, simply overturn the decision by statute. But one 
legislative option is still open as a constitutional matter:  to limit political 
activity as a condition of favorable tax status. 
 Consider fi rst the fact the Supreme Court— in the 1983 case of  Regan 
v. Taxation with Representation of Washington — has expressly upheld limits on 
the political activity of certain charitable corporations. 42  Under section 501(c)
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, organizations with charitable, religious, 
or educational missions can be exempt from income taxes, and donations to 
them are deductible by donors. As a condition of this very valuable tax benefi t, 
such charitable organizations may not participate in lobbying or partisan polit-
ical activities. In  Regan , the Court upheld conditioning the benefi t of special 
 41   States would merely have to resist Delaware’s dominance and assert the authority to govern 
the corporations based in their own jurisdictions.  See  Kent  Greenfi eld ,  Democracy and 
Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law ,  67  Law & Contemp. Probs .  135 ( 2004 ) . 
 42   Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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tax status on the voluntary relinquishment of a right to engage in political 
activity by corporate groups. 
 Note how serious an infringement of political speech this is. Charities are 
often organized around political, social, or economic ideas. Limits on their 
electioneering and lobbying go to the heart of why they exist and what they 
stand for. But the Court nevertheless upheld these limits as constitutional. 
Tax deductibility was seen as a subsidy, and the Court held that the govern-
ment was under no obligation to subsidize the groups’ political activities. 43  
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning was that these restrictions were optional; if 
the founders of an organization wanted it to be politically active, they could 
operate under a separate part of the IRS Code. Alternatives were available for 
those institutions that wanted to engage in politics. 
 Regan is among a number of cases in which the Court considers the notori-
ously tricky question of “unconstitutional conditions.” The Court has not 
always been clear about which conditions survive and which do not. 44  The 
Court seems to apply two analytical touchstones. First, the Court looks at 
the degree of connection between the benefi t offered and the right waived, 
limited, or conditioned. The closer the nexus the more likely the condition 
will be upheld. 45  Additionally, the Court is attentive to the level of pressure 
applied. Conditions cannot coerce; they should be voluntary. 46  This analytical 
touchstone operates independently from the nexus consideration, so not every 
 43   Id. at 544. 
 44   Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (striking down condition); Fed. Comm. Comm’n 
v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (same); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991) (upholding condition); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking 
down condition); Rumsfeld v.  Forum for Acad. and Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) 
(upholding condition); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 
205(2013) (striking down condition). Also relevant are spending clause cases conditioning gov-
ernment benefi ts to states on the states’ willingness to further certain federal policies.  See, e.g ., 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding condition as not coercive); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (striking down condition as coercive). 
 45   Open Soc’y Int’l , 570 U.S. at 215 (describing problem of limiting speech beyond the “contours 
of the program itself”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 580 (describing problem that 
conditions on Medicaid funds on the states “tak[e] the form of threats to terminate other sig-
nifi cant independent grants”) (plurality). But the Court does not always follow this principle, 
especially when the second rule of avoiding coercion does not apply. See Rumsfeld v. Forum 
for Acad. and Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (upholding condition on entire federal funding going 
to universities on whether subparts of those universities accept military recruiters); Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (upholding condition on federal highway funds to states on states’ willingness to 
change drinking age). 
 46   See Open Soc’y Int’l, 570 U.S. at 221 (policy requirement “compels” the affi rmation of belief); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 581 (describing Medicaid condition as “a gun to the 
head”) (plurality); Dole, 483 U.S.  at 211 (conditions cannot be structured so that “pressure 
turns into compulsion”). 
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condition will both be coercive and impose attenuated limitations. But when 
a condition has a loose nexus and imposes such pressure on the benefi ciary 
that it has no genuine choice, there is a good chance the condition will be 
struck down. 
 Even with these restrictions on the ability of government to condition 
benefi ts, it is possible to structure a fi x to the worst aspect of  Citizens United — 
empowering for- profi t companies to engage in unlimited political activity. 
Congress need only apply the model used for charities to corporations. A limit 
on the partisan political activities of corporations can be imposed as a con-
dition of an alternative tax status offering some kind of benefi t in exchange. 
 As long as such tax benefi t is not so great as to be coercive, and corporations 
can voluntarily choose to opt in, the Court would not likely strike down such 
a condition. That would be true even if the condition was seen to be reaching 
beyond the scope of the benefi t to constrain political speech that had little 
connection with that benefi t. The condition on speech upheld in  Regan was 
not closely tied to the scope of the benefi t— tax deductibility— yet the Court 
upheld it. The same would likely be true here. 
 In fact, this policy idea provides an opening for a bipartisan effort. 
 Consider that the business community has long complained about so- 
called “double taxation,” the practice of taxing corporate profi ts once at the 
corporate level and again when distributed to shareholders as dividends. 47  
Double taxation is the source of the conventional argument that it is fair to 
tax dividends at a lower rate than ordinary income since they have already 
been taxed once at the corporate level. 
 Congress could enact a new tax status, available for corporations to opt 
into. Call it Status NP— for “no politics.” “NP corporations” would be subject 
to one benefi t and one limit. The benefi t would be that they will be able to 
deduct issued dividends from their taxable income, ending double taxation. 
The limit would be that they would be subject to the same constraints on pol-
itical activity now applicable to 501(c)(3) charities. Because the status would 
be optional, there is little risk that the provision would run afoul of the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions. 
 The upside of this compromise could be signifi cant. By opting into the 
status, corporations would be opting out of the political contribution arms 
race. (In fact, the law should allow exemptions to antitrust restrictions, so 
that corporate leaders can discuss and agree with competitors to opt- in col-
lectively.) Shareholders could expect more dividends, since corporations can 
 47   See, e.g .,  Robert C.  Pozen ,  Eliminating Corporate Double Taxation ,  Brookings (Apr. 11, 
 2016 ) ,  www.brookings.edu/ opinions/ eliminating- corporate- double- taxation/ . 
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deduct them from their taxable income. The progressive left, the most vocal 
critics of  Citizens United , can use the availability of Status NP as an organiza-
tional tool for shareholder activists seeking to bring corporations to heel. 
 Depending on how many corporations opt in, the budgetary cost may have 
to be mitigated, perhaps by increasing the individual tax rate on dividends or 
by rationalizing the currently broken system of international corporate tax-
ation. But it would be worth the cost. While it would not unravel all of the 
defects of  Citizens United , it could make a signifi cant impact while avoiding 
constitutional diffi culties or requiring a constitutional amendment. 
 IV.  Idea Number Three: Change Corporate Charters 
 One element is consistent across all Supreme Court cases ruling on the First 
Amendment rights of corporations in politics, from  First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti 48  to  Citizens United. In each case the limits on corporate 
spending have come as a matter of campaign fi nance reform, external to cor-
porate law and outside the corporate form. In none of these cases did the limits 
on corporate rights arise as an organic matter within the corporate form itself. 
That is, in every case the role and power of the corporate parties were taken as 
given, and the Court (rightly) assumed the corporations were asserting rights 
that they could properly exercise as a matter of corporate law and prerogative. 
 This opens a third possibility for reform:  imbed limitations on corporate 
political activity within the corporate form as a matter of corporate law. 
 Business corporations are creatures of state law, chartered as legal forms 
to engage in business for profi t. States identify the powers of corporations 
chartered in their jurisdiction and provide the laws of corporate governance 
for those businesses. A  corporation is born only when its founders petition 
for a charter, which in turn bestows benefi ts such as separate legal person-
ality (“corporate personhood”) and perpetual existence uncoupled from their 
founders and investors. Their investors also receive limited liability, which 
protects them from the liabilities of the corporate form. All of these benefi ts 
are in reality state subsidies, bestowing fi nancial advantages upon businesses 
adopting the corporate form. In theory at least, in exchange for these benefi ts 
the state receives the economic advantages derived from having thriving 
businesses creating goods, services, and fi nancial profi t. 
 The chartering document also typically identifi es the purposes of the cor-
poration and its corporate powers. For most of the early history of the nation, 
states chartered companies only for specifi c purposes and often imposed 
 48   First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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signifi cant constraints on the powers of those companies. For example, some 
states prohibited corporations from owning stock in other corporations. But 
beginning in the late nineteenth century, states began the so- called “race to 
the bottom,” permitting charters for “any lawful purpose” and relaxing fi nan-
cial and economic limits on corporate powers. 49  Corporate charters now offer 
wide powers to corporations pursuant to their corporate “personhood,” such 
as the capacity to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts and own property in 
their own name, and to make charitable donations. 50  
 In any event, there is no doubt that corporations exist only by grace of the 
state. In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall , writing for the Court in 
 Dartmouth College v. Woodward , “A corporation is an artifi cial being, invis-
ible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its cre-
ation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.” 51  
 This language and the history on which it is based suggest that the secret to 
limiting corporate political activity is to focus on the  source of corporate power— 
the charters bestowed by state law, which outline the various powers and cap-
acities of corporations. Because a corporation possesses “only those properties” 
state law bestows “expressly or as incidental to its very existence,” then states may 
simply choose to form corporations without the legal capacity to engage in polit-
ical activity. In other words, if corporations were formed under charters limiting 
their political capacity, any political engagement beyond the strictures of the 
charter would be  ultra vires (“beyond the power”) and be subject to regulation 
by the state or injunctive action by shareholders or state attorneys general. 52  
 These limits would pose fewer constitutional problems than bans on cor-
porate expenditures imbedded in campaign fi nance law. The power of states 
to constrain corporate authority has a constitutional pedigree that stretches 
back for nearly two centuries to  Dartmouth College itself. It would be diffi cult 
for the Court to deny the prerogative of the states to defi ne the power and legal 
capacities of corporations that the states themselves choose to charter. (Similar 
reasoning would apply if the federal government stepped into the role as pro-
vider of federal corporate charters. 53  ) 
 49   For more on the history of corporate purpose, see  Kent  Greenfi eld ,  Ultra Vires Lives! 
A  Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could 
Reinforce International Law Norms) ,  87  Va. L. Rev.  1279 ( 2001 ) . 
 50   See, e.g .,  Del. Code Ann . tit. 8, § 122 (2015). 
 51   Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 U.S. (Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
 52   For more on how the doctrine of ultra vires could work in modern times, see Greenfi eld,  Ultra 
Vires Lives! ,  supra  note 49 . 
 53   See Greenfi eld,  End Delaware’s Corporate Dominance ,  supra  note 26 . 
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 The central objection to this argument would point to the notion from 
 Dartmouth College that the state cannot in fact take away powers “incidental 
to [the] very existence” of corporations. Some powers of corporations are so 
inherent in the corporate form itself that to remove them, or make them con-
ditional, would be to erase the signifi cance of the form itself. In this light, few 
statements can improve on that of then- Justice William Rehnquist , dissenting 
in  Bellotti : “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corpor-
ation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, … 
our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are ‘inci-
dental to its very existence.’ ” 54  
 This inquiry must necessarily begin with a discussion of what corporations 
are for, what purposes they serve. This in turn draws on a broad scholarly lit-
erature, in the corporate law fi eld for the most part, about the purpose of the 
corporation. There is much disagreement about the question of  for whom are 
corporate managers trustees, that is, whether corporations should be managed 
primarily to serve shareholder interests or to serve a more robust set of stake-
holder interests. But there is indeed broad consensus that corporations are 
economic entities, created for the purpose of benefi ting society by creating 
wealth through the production of goods and services. The constitutional 
analysis should begin, then, with the presumption that corporations should 
receive the rights necessarily incidental to serving that economic purpose, and 
should not receive those that are not germane to that purpose. This presump-
tion may be overcome in specifi c contexts or to further other constitutional 
values, but that is the starting place for analysis. 
 The best example of an incidental power would be the right of corporations 
to own property. A  corporation without property rights is unworthy of the 
name. Property rights are “incidental to the very existence” of corporations. 
It would be impermissible to condition the grant of corporate status on the 
waiver of property rights. Similarly, corporations could not be required as a 
condition of their existence to waive their Fifth Amendment rights to be free 
of governmental takings without just compensation. 
 Notice how this analysis mimics the unconditional conditions analysis. 
Some conditions are permissible; some are not. Some powers are incidental 
to the creation of the corporate form; some are not. The best reading of 
 Dartmouth College and its progeny is that the more central a corporate power 
is to the nature of the corporation itself, the less likely it can permissibly limit 
it or make it the subject of a condition. Another way to conceptualize this 
 54   First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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point is to say the state need not grant corporate charters, but if it does so such 
charters must contain the “core” rights and powers of corporations. 
 This begs the First Amendment question. Can states condition the grant 
of corporate status on the limitation of the resulting entity’s speech rights? 
Unsurprisingly, this is a complex issue. 55  But it is the correct question to ask, 
and it is a different question than the Court has been asking. 
 The answer depends on whether the asserted right is core to, or inconsistent 
with, corporations’ economic purpose. Sometimes it makes little sense to pro-
tect the First Amendment rights of corporations. Securities laws, for example, 
routinely require corporations to disclose to the public their fi nancial well-
being. If human beings were required to reveal personal fi nances, they would 
rightly object to the requirement as coerced speech, a violation of the First 
Amendment. But corporations’ arguments along those lines would fail, and 
they should. On the other hand, it is closer to the core of the purpose of a 
corporation to have the ability to speak publicly about matters germane to 
its economic role. That is, speech that is “incidental” to its very existence in 
the marketplace should receive the protection of constitutional scrutiny. This 
includes commercial speech at least, and presumptively even that political 
speech concerning economic matters germane to the business. 
 There is more to be said here. The legal context is diffi cult, and crafting 
the proper level of constraint on corporate political activity may require doc-
trinal trial and error. But I do believe that the Court, notwithstanding  Citizens 
United , could (and should) uphold organic, corporate law limits on the capacity 
of corporations to engage in electoral politics not germane to its business. Such 
limits could appear in corporate law statutes with language akin to the following:
 As a condition of these powers and privileges, no business corporation 
chartered under this title shall have the capacity to expend general treasury 
funds to infl uence the outcome of any federal, state, or local election, unless 
such expenditure pertains to matters germane to its primary business activ-
ities or takes place in the normal operations of a business corporation whose 
primary business activities include the dissemination of information or 
opinion. 
 V.  Conclusion 
 Corporate law offers real possibilities for dealing with the harmful effects 
of  Citizens United . Most opponents of corporate power have focused on 
 55   And I  am trying to answer it.  See  Greenfield, Corporations Are People Too ,  supra 
 note 1 . 
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constitutional remedies and have ignored the potential corporate law remedies. 
This blind spot might originate, frankly, simply from the fact that  Citizens 
United was a constitutional case and most constitutional law professors do not 
claim expertise in corporate law. Constitutional law is public law; corporate 
law is seen as private law. Not many legal scholars bridge this gap. But the 
need to do so is clear and should no longer be ignored. Indeed, the purposes 
of campaign fi nance reform would be well served by such bridges. 
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